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DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Co. v. MacGregor, 169 Iowa 5, 149 N. W. 617, it is clear that the parole
agreement of the parties can be shown, as in the principal case, to
prove the necessary intent to rebut the presumption of a gift, advancement, or settlement which is raised by law. Appeal of Wilson, 84
Conn. 56o, 8o Atl. 718.
The parol agreement, however, which is
thus shown and relied upon to rebut the presumption of law, must not
raise a trust which in character is different from that which the law
implies from the facts of the case. Brettenbucher v. Oppenheim, i6o
Cal. 98, 116 Pac. 55.
A beneficiary of a resulting trust may be
barred from enforcing his claim by laches. Moore v. Taylor, 251 Ill.
468, 96 N. E. 229.
The defense of laches is independent of the
statute of limitations, but yet it has been held that if the statutory
period has expired, there is a strong presumption of laches.
Taylor
v. Coggins, 244 Pa. 228, 90 At. 633. The term "laches," in the broad
legal sense, as interpreted by courts of equity, signifies such unreasonable delay in the assertion of and attempted securing of equitable
rights as should constitute in equity and good conscience a bar to recovery.
Gaff v. Portland Town & Mineral Co., 12 Colo. App. lo6,
54 Pac. 854. Since the courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of
laches to the rights of a cestui que trust, Jenkins v. Hammerschlag,
38 App. Div. 209, 56 N. Y. Supp. 534, no doubt the courts will require
strong evidence of the operation of an inequity by enforcing the resulting trust before the doctrine will be held to bar the claim of the
cestui. Since the facts of each particular case must necessarily govern
the application of the doctrine, then if the relationship of husband and
wife exists between the parties, the intimate relations between the
husband and wife, and the reasons for the trust must be considered in
determining the defense of laches to an action to establish a resulting
trust to property taken in the name of one spouse, when the other
pays the consideration.
Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 NE. 789,
Hence, as in the principal case, the husband purchasing in the. name
of the wife, in whom he placed utmost confidence, and who expressed
the intention of turning over the title to the husband, is not required
to institute suit to protect his interest in the property during the wife's
lifetime in order to prevent himself from being guilty of laches.
Wright v. 'Wright, supra; Davis v. Downer, 21o Mass. 573, 97 NE. 90
Roy K. REDETZK .
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THE CONSTITUTION AND I.
During recent years there has been considerable effort put forth
to limit the power of our courts to declare laws unconstitutional, one
of the proposals being to give Congress the power to make effective
any law that had been declared unconstitutional by mere re-passage
after such a decision.
It should be recalled that, in order to obtain approval of the document by a sufficient number of states, certain additions were agreed
to in the original draft.
The purpose of these additions, or amendments, was to prevent
the possible loss of some of the "blessings of liberty" gained through
the sacrifices of war.
And so Congress was denied the right to pass a law: i. Restricting the exercise of religious preferences; 2. Abridging the freedom of
speech or assembly; 3. Quartering soldiers in time of peace without
consent; 4. Allowing search or seizure of persons, houses, papers or
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effects without proper warrant; 5. Denying the right of trial by jury;
6. Permitting review in a higher court of facts tried by a jury, except
according to the rules of common law; 7. Requiring excessive bail,
assessing excessive fines, or meting out cruel and unusual punishment.
Then, to make certain the meaning, this special article was inserted: "The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
And to make doubly certain, this provision was also inserted: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people."
The framers of the Constitution saw clearly that cases would
arise demanding interpretation of laws passed under the Constitution.
They recalled what William Pitt and Edmund Burke had just said in
the halls of the British Parliament. They were reminded by Madison:
"It is against the enterprising ambition of this department (Congress)
that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions."
And they had before them the Massachusetts statement of the American philosophy of government, made seven years
before the writing of the Constitution, namely: "In the government of
this commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them;
the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
either of them-to the end that it may be a government of laws and not
of men."
And so the Founders vested such power of interpretation
in the courts.
It is argued, upon the assumption, probably, that conditions and
human nature have materially changed, that the proposal referred to in
the first paragraph is not intended to weaken or impair the provisions
of the Constitution relating to the Federal Courts. But, should it be
adopted, the inevitable result would be to make Congress supreme,
whatever the intention. That done, there would be NO judicial check
to unconstitutional legislation, and rights that you and I and John Doe
now have under the Constitution could be wiped out by a temporary
majority in Congress.
I cannot afford to take that chance.
Can you?
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